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This paper examines the comparative efficiency of family vs corporate farms. It decomposes 
efficiency into two distinct sources - management capabilities and organisational differences. 
We find evidence for organisational efficiency gains from family farming, relative to 
corporate farming and these appear to increase with family involvement.  With regard to the 
management capabilities however, family farms do not compare so favourably. Furthermore 
family involvement does not seem to have any systematic effect on the management 
capabilities derived efficiency.  The findings indicate that further investigation of the way 
family farms employ and build management capabilities is needed to substantiate any 
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1. Introduction  
Family farming around the world faces multiple challenges. The main economic challenges 
surround two key issues of access, at the production and marketing stages respectively, to 
resources such as land, capital and labour, and to appropriate bargaining power in the food 
chain and other markets. These challenges vary in degree between large and small family 
farms, and by availability of family labour, and particularly between the different Member 
States of the EU having different farming structures.  
Family farming has long been a concept that has attracted considerable attention from both 
UHVHDUFKHUV DQG SROLF\ PDNHUV ,QGHHG IURP WKH YHU\ RXWVHW RI WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶V
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), it has claimed family farmers as its main target group 
(Fennell, 1997). And yet there has never been an agreed EU definition on the concept (Hill, 
1993). There are probably many reasons for this, some of which include the complex and 
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multifaceted nature of the phenomenon. Since this paper focuses on the efficiency of family 
farms relative to corporate farms, it is nevertheless useful to briefly review some definitions 
of the concept in order to  determine which aspects of such definitions should be of 
prioritised in the following analysis. In this regard we will start with the FAO definition 
SURSRVHGZKHQDQQRXQFLQJDVDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO\HDURIIDPLO\IDUPLQJ,WVWDWHVWKDW³a 
family farm is an agricultural holding which is managed and operated by a household and 
where farm labour is largely supplied by that household. The family and the farm are linked, 
co-HYROYH DQG FRPELQH HFRQRPLF HQYLURQPHQWDO VRFLDO DQG FXOWXUDO IXQFWLRQV´ (FAO, 
2013). There are two aspects of relevance to the study in this definition. One is the emphasis 
on the special mode of management and operation of the farm, exemplified by considerations 
of household control and use of family labour. The other aspect is the recognition that family 
farms may follow non-economic objectives dictated by family values. Still, in EU context 
IDPLO\IDUPLQJ LVPRUHRIWHQYLHZHGDVDEXVLQHVV³Family farming is more than business 
but still a business´ (&  6XFK D YLHZ VLWV EHWWHU ZLWKLQ WKH WUDGLWLRQV RI HFRQRPLF
analysis, in that the family values can be described in terms of ownership, control and 
inheritance of assets (Gasson and Errington, 1993)., and therefore are much more easily 
accounted for in contrast to more general and difficult to identify sociological notions. 
Later attempts to define the concept such as the working document presented at the informal 
PHHWLQJRIWKH0LQLVWHUVRI$JULFXOWXUHVWDWHWKDW³major share of capital is built up by the 
PDQDJHUDQGKLVRUKHUIDPLO\´DQGWKDW³WKHPDMRUVKDUHRIWKHIDPLO\¶VLQFRme is derived 
IURPIDUPLQJ´(Council of the EU, 26 July 2013). These appear to further lean towards the 
issue of control and (via the importance of income) to the overall involvement and 
intertwining of farming and family. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this paper we will view a farm as a set of incentives and 
mechanisms that determine its operation. For family farming, this set of incentives and 
mechanisms would be different from those characterising non-family farms.  
The latter group, called hereafter corporate farms, is also complex and heterogeneous. It 
includes several types of family-run and non-family run companies, production cooperatives, 
trusts and charities (Davidova and Thomson, 2014). One common characteristics is that they 
use predominantly hired labour.  
The prospects for family farming are related to farm specialisation. Allen and Lueck (1998) 
suggest that the value of the family farming declines as farms specialise into the production 
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of fewer outputs. By the same token, if a farm diversifies into processing stages requiring 
different equipment and skills, the typical family farm will be at a disadvantage. In summary, 
some economic and technological factors may lead to continued structural change towards 
non-family forms of organisation of agriculture. 
On the other hand, family farming has survived and re-emerged from crises, wars and natural 
disasters, and adjusted to changing economic fortunes and in some countries to dramatic 
changes in political context. This has never been a smooth and painless process, and millions 
of small farmers have disappeared to give way often to larger, more efficient and more 
competitive farms not reliant on family labour and able to adopt new inputs and technologies 
(Davidova and Thomson, 2014). 
Economic theory backs these survival prospects, suggesting arguments for the superiority of 
the family type of organisation in agriculture. Family farms are more flexible in responding 
to market constraints and more resilient to shocks than the more capital-intensive 
professionally managed farms relying on hired labou (Brookfield and Parsons, 2007). The 
theoretical arguments have been centred on the relative transaction costs associated with the 
employment of family and hired labour, and the different incentive structures which motivate 
individuals. Family labour has stronger incentives to be more productive and requires lower 
monitoring costs because the members of the farm family are residual claimants on farm 
profits (Allen and Lueck, 1998; Pollak 1985; Schmitt, 1991, 1993). The exposure of 
agriculture to weather, pests and disease risks makes it harder to link work effort to output, 
making it difficult to design the right incentives to motivate hired labour. Additionally, the 
spatial dispersion of work makes the monitoring costs in agriculture particularly large. 
Pollack (1985) emphasises families ability to provide incentives and monitor performance, 
ability that is higher than in corporate farms. This implies that the average productivity of 
labour on family farms may be higher when compared to hired workers on the corporate 
farms. Kostov et al. (2016) termed the above a µPRWLYDWLRQ effect¶ of family labour. The 
concept is similar to what Valentinov (2007) calls µefficiency of monitoring activities¶.  
However, Polack (1985) also underlines some disadvantages of a family business. These 
include the possible toleration of inefficiency and slack performance, and the possible lack of 
talent and skills required for a successful business performance. To these could be added the 
possible presence of non-economic objectives in family farming, e.g. to produce food for the 
household, provide employment to family members and preserve the farm for the next 
generation. Some of these disadvantages are due to the complex character of the family farm, 
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which is at the same time a production unit, a consumption unit (household) and a focus of 
kinship and family (Djurfeldt, 1996). All this can limit farm growth, produce 
underemployment and reduce productivity. This might lead to a situation in which more 
family-oriented farms lose relative efficiency in comparison to the corporate farms. Kostov et 
al. (2016) refer to the latter as the µPDQDJHPHQWcapabilities deterioration effect¶. Due to the 
existence of these two opposing effects (positive effect of more efficient monitoring and 
negative aspects of family farms discussed above), it cannot be said a priori that, from an 
economic point of view, family farming is a superior organisation of production. 
As mentioned, in this paper the farm organisation is treated as a set of incentives and 
mechanisms that contribute to allowing a farm to achieve a certain level of efficiency. While 
the transaction costs literature is interested in what mechanisms and incentives are better 
suited to achieve this, the question in this paper is how the outcome would change if these 
mechanisms and incentives vary. The question has important policy relevance. Concerning 
the EU, for example, the European Parliament (EP) Committee on Agriculture and Rural 
Development (COMAGRI) published a motion for DQ(35HVROXWLRQRQµ+RZWKH&$3FDQ
LPSURYH MRE FUHDWLRQ LQ UXUDO DUHDV¶ ,W states that ³support should be provided first and 
foremost to family farms run by one or more responsible, independent farmers who work on 
their farms in an effective manner and who are much better able to deal with any problems by 
adapting their production and/or their production methods and by diversifying their activities 
when necessary´ (COMAGRI, 2016). What lies behind this statement is an implicit 
assumption that family farming is a superior form of organisation in agriculture. In this 
context, it is important to investigate to what extent in the 21st century, with predominantly 
capital-intensive technology and high requirements to farm managers to run a business that is 
both economically viable and environmentally sustainable, family farming still can exhibit a 
superior economic performance.  
This study employs as a criterion for a family farm the use of family labour in the broadest 
possible sense, i.e. any farm which employs family (unpaid) labour. The source of farm-level 
data is the EU Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), since FADN allows the 
classification of farms according to the use of family or non-family labour.  
A non-parametric non-separable farm production function is estimated, and the efficiency 
scores are derived for both family and corporate farms. The distribution of these efficiency 
scores for the two farm types is then compared by using their empirical probability density 
functions. The relative difference in the probability density functions for the efficiency scores 
5 
 
of family and corporate farms is used to represent the efficiency gains, or losses, attributable 
to family farming.  One of the contributions of the paper to the debate about the survivability 
of family farming under the conditions of technical change and weak power in the globalised 
food chain is that by re-specifying the production function used to derive efficiency scores, 
the total efficiency effects are decomposed into two distinct components, namely M-
efficiency which measures the individual faUP¶V PDQDJHULDO FDSDELOLWLHV WR UHDOLVH any 
efficiency gains and F-efficiency, associated with the potential gains/losses derivable from the 
family form of organisation of farming activities.  
The analysis considers separately four EU Member States, each characterised by a different 
mix of family and corporate farms - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Spain.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the analytical 
approach and section 3 details the estimation strategy. Section 4 describes briefly the data and 
section 5 presents the results. Section 6 formulates the conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Analytical Approach 
In order to rank farms by their technical efficiency, first, a measure of technical efficiency for 
all farms is calculated. If family farms are more efficient than the corporate ones, then the 
expectations are that there will be more family farms at the higher levels of efficiency and 
vice versa. By comparing the distribution of such an efficiency measure for family and 
corporate farms, inference about the relative efficiency of family farms can be carried out. 
Logically such a comparison could be based on their probability distribution functions. In 
order to do this we consider the differential between the empirical probability density 
functions of the efficiency measure for family versus corporate farms. Hereafter we will refer 
to the above as (efficiency) density differential.  
If indeed family farms are more efficient than their corporate counterparts, then there will be 
more family farms (relative to the corresponding number of corporate farms) at higher 
efficiency ranges. This means that there will be higher probability of finding family (vs 
corporate) farms at larger values of the efficiency measure. Therefore this should translate 
into a positive efficiency density differential at the higher efficiency ranges. Similarly at 
lower efficiency ranges, the expectation would be for a negative density differential. Putting 
the above two expected outcomes together means that, under the hypothesis of more efficient 
family farms, upward-sloping density differentials will be obtained - from negative values at 
the lower efficiency ranges to positive values at the higher efficiency ranges. Similarly, a 
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downward-sloping density differential would indicate that family farms are less efficient.  
The density differential can be viewed in the same way as a probability density function 
(PDF). The main difference is that since the PDF function shows the probability of 
occurrence of a certain outcome, it is only defined for non-negative values. The density 
differential on the other hand is essentially a difference between two distinct PDFs. As such, 
it will produce negative, as well as positive values. So the interpretation for the density 
differential values is in terms of excess probability. Positive values for the efficiency density 
differential mean that family farms are more likely to obtain the corresponding values of the 
efficiency measure and vice versa. Consider the following example.  Let us assume that for 
some level of efficiency (i.e. value of the efficiency measure) the family farms PDF value is 
30% and that for corporate farms is 20%. Then the density differential value at that point 
would be 0.3-0.2=0.1. This would mean that there will be, in relative terms, more family 
farms than corporate farms at that particular point, i.e. achieving this particular efficiency 
level. The result from such a simple differential is however tricky to interpret. The relative 
density differential is much easier to interpret. In the above example the relative (of family vs 
corporate) density differential at the same point will be (0.3-0.2)/0.2=0.5.  In this case, we 
could say that a family farm is 50% more likely to achieve this particular level of efficiency 
than a corporate one. Therefore, hereafter we will use the relative efficiency density 
differential.  
The efficiency density differential between the two groups of farms is decomposed into two 
distinct components. Using a standard approach to estimate an efficiency frontier and thus 
allocate efficiency scores to each farm essentially amounts to imposing the same efficiency 
frontier to both farm types. In this case, since we do not explicitly distinguish between family 
and corporate farms, any effects that are due to such differences, are not accounted for in the 
estimation of the production frontier. Such differences (between family and corporate farms) 
will then be fully absorbed by the efficiency scores. Consequently, the density differentials 
will account for these differences, but will also include efficiency effects that do not depend 
on the family/corporate farm distinction. We want to distinguish between these two types of 
effects and for this reason we propose to decompose the efficiency density differential as 
described below. 
Let us assume that family involvement in farming can potentially have transformative effect 
on farm productivity (although we do not assume whether any such effect is positive or 
negative). What we mean under transformative effect is that family involvement could 
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modify the nature of the production relationship (i.e. lead to essentially different production 
function). Furthermore, let us also approximate the extent of family involvement by the 
amount of family labour employed. Then a proper account of the farm production potential, 
that takes into account the possibility for such transformative effect, could be derived by 
considering a production function that treats family and hired labour as different inputs. As a 
result, the efficiency frontier derived from this approach will vary with the type of farm and, 
hence, the maximum output possible for a given farm will depend on the amount of family 
labour it employs. Since we hypothesise that the level of family involvement can effectively 
modify the production function, this means that only non-additive specifications for the 
production function are admissible. Let us consider what this alternative approach estimates.  
Since the differences between family and corporate farms are accounted for by the extent of 
family involvement (which is zero for corporate farms), the production possibilities frontier 
estimated under this approach will account for any such differences. Hence in a way each 
farm under this approach will have its own specific maximum achievable output that depends 
on the level of family involvement. Therefore by accounting for the difference between 
family and corporate farms in the frontier, we effectively exclude such effects from the 
efficiency scores and therefore from the resulting efficiency density differentials. 
The efficiency measure obtained from differentiating between family and hired labour input 
is referred to hereafter as M-efficiency. If one assumes that the mechanisms through which 
this potential is to be realised is the management of farm production, then M-efficiency is in 
fact a measure of the management capability of a farm.  
Therefore, the efficiency density differential can be viewed as consisting of two components, 
namely the management capability of a farm (which we measure by M-efficiency), and a 
remainder, which would in fact measure the differences between family and corporate farms. 
Hereafter, we will refer to this difference as F-efficiency density differential and we construct 
it as simply taking the difference between the aggregate efficiency differential and the M-
efficiency differential. 
The comparative efficiency of family and corporate farms is thus decomposed into two 
components: management capabilities (i.e. M-efficiency) and difference due to organisational 
form, (i.e.  F-efficiency), in this case difference between family and corporate farms.  The 
basis for this decomposition is the family involvement in the business operations. However 
one needs to acknowledge that family farms are also able to trade off returns to family owned 
land and capital in order to maintain family relevant values (such as preserving the farm for 
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future generations). Under perfectly competitive markets this would not be an issue. In the 
presence of a range of possible market imperfections, e.g. if capital or land markets are more 
constrained than labour markets, such non-labour related difference will accumulate in the 
M-efficiency differentials. 
When asking the question of whether family farms are indeed superior form of organisation 
of agricultural production, it is the F-efficiency differential that is of primary interest. If for 
whatever reason family farms lack the management capabilities to utilise their potential, they 
will be characterised by lower M-efficiency and this may (partially of fully) offset the 
positive effect of F-efficiency. It is however possible that family farms are better in achieving 
their potential than their non-family counterparts in which case they will exhibit a higher M-
efficiency than the corporate farms. Therefore, the efficiency decomposition, presented above 
provides a useful framework to evaluate the relative efficiency of family and corporate farms. 
 
3. Implementation details 
3.1. Efficiency estimation 
In order to construct efficiency density differential and their decomposition as discussed 
previously, one just needs efficiency scores for each farm in the sample. The exact method 
used to estimate such efficiency scores is inconsequential and a variety of alternatives could 
be used. The main requirement is that the individual efficiency scores for each farm in the 
dataset need to be estimated based on two different production functions: one that includes 
labour as a single input, and another that differentiates family and non-family labour. There 
are different methods available to calculate such efficiency scores. The conventional 
approach to efficiency relies upon some form of frontier estimation and conceptualises 
efficiency in terms of distance between actual realisations and the estimated frontier. There 
are several estimation measures. The most basic and easy to interpret one is the distance 
function which is simply Öy y  (y being actual production, while Öy  being the corresponding 
maximum output, defined by the efficient frontier). The efficient frontier can be recovered 
non-parametrically via e.g. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), or estimated parametrically 
by employing some additional assumptions.  
This paper uses a different way to calculate an efficiency frontier, based on quantile 
regression methods. The approach taken and the rationale for it are outlined below. 
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The conditional quantile regression estimated a pre-specified quantile of the conditional 
distribution of the response variable, given a set of covariates. When the functional 
relationship that is modelled is a production function, this conditional quantile can be 
interpreted as a level of technical efficiency. For example, the 0.9th quantile regression 
models a hypothetical farm that is more efficient than 90% of the other farms in the sample 
and one can define this as a 90% efficient farm. Consider the quantile regression for 
 1n nW   , where n is the sample size. This will result in estimating the production 
function for the most efficient farm in the dataset. The latter is effectively an estimate of the 
efficiency frontier. 
+HQGULFNVDQG.RHQNHU SQRWHG WKDW WKH IURQWLHUPRGHOV³FRUUHVSRQGFORVHO\ WR
models for extreme quantiles of a stochastic production surface". So using extreme 
conditional quantile functions was adopted in Bernini et al (2004) and Behr (2010). Detailed 
analysis of such quantile based efficiency measures is presented in Aragon et al. (2005). The 
above papers adopt a restrictive linear quantile model formulation, which requires parametric 
production function. Nonparametric extensions have been considered in Martins-Filho and 
Yao (2008), Wang and Wang (2013) and Wang et al. (2014).  
However, estimating extreme quantiles results in loss of estimation efficiency (see 
Chernozhukov, 2005). In simple terms the issue is as follows. In the mean based frontier 
estimation the overall shape of the frontier is based on an average estimated relationship 
(modified by a parametric assumption about the distribution of the efficiency scores). The 
overall shape of the estimated relationship for conditional quantiles however changes with the 
TXDQWLOH 6R XVLQJ WZR GLIIHUHQW TXDQWLOH IXQFWLRQV DV µIURQWLHUV¶ FDQ FKDQJH WKH UHODWLYH
distance from each observation to the frontier and hence can affect the sorting of efficiency 
scores amongst farms. It is the efficiency sorting, not so much the values of the efficiency 
scores, that affect the construction of probability densities and their differentials, which are a 
centrepiece of our approach. Such a problem would not arise if the corresponding quantile 
functions are parallel to each other. Hence, more extreme quantiles estimates are conceptually 
closer to the actual frontier, but their estimation is less reliable in statistical sense. Less 
extreme quantiles are further from the actual frontier, but their shape estimation is more 
reliable. 
The estimation efficiency loss can be reduced by estimating a less extreme tail quantile. 
There is a trade-off between the complexity of the production function model (in that more 
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complex specification involve higher number of parameters and therefore more estimation 
efficiency loss) and the choice of such tail quantile. For example for parametric specifications 
of the production frontier Bernini et al (2004) and Behr (2010) proposed using the 0.95th 
quantile regression. However non-parametric estimation involves greater degree of 
complexity. Hence in order to ensure reliable estimation of the upper conditional quantile 
functions (see Chernozhukov, 2005; Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val, 2011 for details), 
ZKLFK ZLOO EH XVHG DV µIURQWLHUV¶, we use the 0.9th quantile for non-parametric estimation. 
Hereafter, these upper quantile regressions are referred to as W -quantile envelopes, e.g. the 
0.9th quantile regression is referred to as a 0.9th quantile envelope. Quantile based frontier 
models do not envelope all the data, and as such, similarly to the m-output frontier models of 
Cazals et al. (2002), are robust to outliers. 
The paper employs quantile regression residuals to construct efficiency measures. In a W -
quantile regression, approximately W  of the residuals will be negative and 1- W  of the 
residuals will be positive. The distance function derived from such a quantile regression 
model would then produce a measure of efficiency that we will hereafter refer to as an 
efficiency score. The efficiency scores are a linear function of the residuals i.e. 
  / 1 1ÖÖ Ö Ö
y yy y
y y
H     where H  are the residuals. This distance function efficiency scores  
are a measure of technical efficiency thus larger numbers denote better technical efficiency. 
The above means that the efficiency scores can be interpreted as conditional (on W ) 
efficiency. When W =0.9, 10 per cent of the farms will have positive residuals since by the 
actual definition of the µHIILFLHQW¶ IDUms, 10 per cent of the actual farms are more efficient. 
This efficiency measure will be under 1 for 90 per cent of the farms and 10 per cent of the 
obtained values from the data sample will actually exceed 1.  
Therefore, unlike the conventional efficiency scores, the ones we obtain here are not limited 
from above. ,W ZRXOG EH WHPSWLQJ WR µVWDQGDUGLVH¶ WKHVH residuals to a [0,1] interval to 
resemble the standard efficiency measures. If we were to do so, however, we would lose the 
natural conditional efficiency interpretation and mask their dependence on the level of 
efficiency represented by the quantile envelope. Instead, in this paper the density function of 
the conditional efficiency scores is used to compare the efficiency distribution of different 
farms. Using the upper quantile envelope (i.e. high W ) with non-parametric estimation allows 
a natural equivalence to non-parametric DEA estimation. If we wanted results to resemble 
more conventional approach, we could have trimmed away the observation lying outside the 
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quantile envelope (i.e. effectively treating them as outliers). Such an approach would 
however exclude the most efficient farms and is undesirable. 
The estimated frontier in the stochastic frontier approach is a fitted production function plus 
disturbance (usually Gaussian and iid) term plus an efficiency score shifter (term reflecting 
the distribution of the efficiency scores usually with a half-normal distribution). So one can 
think of the stochastic frontier approach along the following lines. A mean production 
function is estimated. Then this function is shifted outwards by the efficiency scores using an 
assumption about their distribution. If the efficiency scores were uniformly distributed the 
frontier would have exactly the same shape as the mean production function. In this 
estimation process this shape is determined by all observations in equal degree and also 
depends on an arbitrary assumption on the distribution of the efficiency measures. The latter 
is an undesirable feature. The strength of the quantile regression approach is that it does not 
employ any distributional assumptions and hence does not restrict the distribution of the 
efficiency measures that are being calculated from it. The other advantage is that in quantile 
regression the shape of the estimated function changes with the quantiles and although all 
observations contribute to it, the ones that are associated with higher efficiency are weighted 
differently to those that are related to lower efficiency farms. Since the shape of the frontier is 
essential in calculating efficiency scores, the quantile approach is preferable in that it does 
not effectively impose the same input/output relationship on both efficient and inefficient 
farms. Non-parametric alternatives such as DEA are less susceptible to the above mentioned 
problem. The issue with such alternatives is that they lead to the other extreme, i.e. that 
inefficient farms have no contribution to the frontier estimation and outliers drastically affect 
the latter. In effect, the quantile regression approach would essentially converge to DEA in 
the case of non-parametric estimation of an extreme quantile.  
 
3.2. Quantile regression and density ratios estimation 
Here the unknown production function is estimated non-parametrically and thus avoids the 
necessity to specify any pre-defined functional form. The non-parametric quantile regression 
applied here can be expressed as: 
 y f X uW W   (1) 
 st  | 0q u XW W   (2) 
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 where y is the dependent variable vector, X is a matrix containing the covariates,  .fW  is a 
quantile dependent arbitrary (i.e. unspecified) function, W is the quantile being modelled and 
uW  are the residuals. In contrast to the more widely known linear quantile regression 
specification, the effect of the covariates is given by a non-parametrically specified function, 
which itself is quantile dependent, and the conditional quantile restriction in (2) is specified 
with regard to this non-parametric function.  This quantile restriction states that the W quantile 
of the residuals is zero. In the standard mean regression the corresponding assumption is that 
the expected value of the residuals is zero and that they are characterised by some assumed 
distribution (usually Gaussian with a fixed variance). 
Estimations in this paper follow the indirect method of Li and Racine (2008). It consists of 
two distinct steps. First, the conditional distribution function of the dependent variable with 
regard to the covariates is estimated. This is a standard (conditional) density estimation 
problem. Then conditional quantile estimates are recovered by inverting the conditional 
density function via locally constant kernel estimation approach.  This is also a standard non-
parametric problem, since it relates the conditional quantiles of the dependent variables 
(obtained from the conditional density) to the covariates using a kernel weighting with 
bandwidths specified in the first step. 
Following the quantile envelope function estimation we obtain efficiency score measures for 
each farm in the sample. Then we split the farms into family and corporate farms and 
construct the efficiency probability density differentials which form the basis of the analysis.  
The relative density differentials used in the paper are simply:     1fam corppdf z pdf z  , 
where  fampdf z  and  corppdf z  are the empirical probability density functions for the 
efficiency scores for the family and corporate farms.  The efficiency scores themselves are 
calculated as   z= / Ö Ö1
uy y
y
W  , where Öy  are the fitted values from the estimated quantile 
envelope (i.e.  Ö f X y uy W W   ) and uW  are the residuals from the estimated quantile 
regression model in (1). 
Therefore we need to estimate the density ratio    fam corppdf z pdf z . A straightforward but 
naïve approach to density-ratio estimation would be to separately estimate the corresponding 
probability densities (corresponding to the numerator and the denominator of the ratio), and 
then take the ratio of the estimated densities. However, unless we have simple parametric 
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density model, density estimation could be problematic, particularly in high-dimensional 
cases (Vapnik 1998). Therefore, for reliable statistical inference it is preferable to directly 
estimate the density ratio without going through separate density estimation for the numerator 
and the denominator. There are many methods that have been used for that purpose. One of 
the most popular methods, due to its ease of implementation and computational properties, is 
the unconstrained Least-Squares Importance Fitting approach. This approach is a squared-
loss version of the M-estimator for the linear density-ratio model. It has a closed-form 
solution and the µleave-one-out¶ cross-validation score associated with this approach can be 
analytically computed. Here a kernel version of the latter is employed (Kanamori et al, 2012) 
together with analytical µleave-one-out¶ cross-validation. The method provides us with 
density ratio and we convert this to a relative density differential by simply subtracting 1 
from it. 
4. Data 
The data used in this study comes IURPWKH(8¶V)DUP$FFRXQWDQF\'DWD1HWZRUN)$'1
The FADN samples include only commercial holdings defined in terms of their economic 
size, so that very small and semi-subsistence family farms are excluded. The analysis focuses 
on four EU Member States which differ substantially according to their farm structure. These 
states are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Spain. The Czech Republic has a farm 
structure with a particularly high share of corporate farms which do not rely heavily on 
family labour. The farm structure in Hungary presents a mix between corporate and family 
farms. Romania is the EU Member State with the largest number of small family farms and a 
high proportion of these farms, 93 per cent, are considered to be semi-subsistence holdings 
which consume more than half of the farm output within the household (Davidova et. al., 
2013). Semi-subsistence farms affect the nature of the commercial farms which are the 
FADN field of observation since they present an inelastic supply of commercial farm labour. 
)LQDOO\6SDLQ¶VDJULFXOWXUHLVdominated by family farms.  
Altogether, these four countries account for 12,929 observations in the EU FADN dataset, out 
of which 11,606 are family farms (89.7 per cent of all observations). In order to apply the 
analytical approach described above, the following variables were extracted from the FADN 
dataset. The dependent variable is total output measured in value expressed in the currency of 
the respective country (cu). The production function is specified with regard to labour, land 
(in hectares of utilised agricultural area (UAA)), capital and intermediate consumption, the 
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last two components are also expressed in value terms. Total labour input is measured in 
annual work units (AWU) and is split into two variables: family labour and non-family 
labour. As explained previously, these two labour variables are used as separate inputs in the 
production functions in the M- efficiency estimation and are added together as a single input 
for the µtotal¶ efficiency estimation.  
Capital is calculated as the difference between the total fixed assets, on the one hand, and 
land, permanent crops and quotas (all in monetary terms), on the other. In this way a proxy 
for a long-term capital is obtained. The value of the land is excluded from the capital measure 
in order to avoid double counting since it is used as a separate input to the production 
function. FADN bundles together the value of land with permanent crops and policy quotas, 
and does not provide information for the quality of land. Finally total intermediate 
consumption is extracted as calculated in FADN.  
In order to provide an insight into the data for each country, the family farms are split into 
four groups, according to family to hired labour ratio. The logic is that higher values of this 
ratio signifies family farms with greater family involvement. Table 1 presents some summary 
statistics for corporate farms and family farms with the latter grouped according to the degree 
of family involvement. The degree of family involvement is measured by the family labour 
input  and is grouped according to the quartiles of the latter. The fourth group (i.e. fourth 
quartile according to the family labour input) contains by far the largest number of farms, 
with almost half of the total number of farms in the three EU New Member States and 73 per 
cent of the Spanish farms falling in this category. Considerable differences between countries 
are noticeable. In Romania, Hungary and the Czech Republic, corporate farms account for a 
large proportion of total output, UAA and labour utilisation, while family farms dominate 
6SDLQ¶VDJULFXOWXUHLQWKese respects. As expected, corporate ones are larger in all countries.  
It is also informative to compare the average values of the family labour input. One would 
have expected that family labour input should increase with the corresponding quartile, but 
this is not uniformly the case. In the Czech Republic and Hungary the average family labour 
in the fourth group is actually lower than in the third one, while for the other two countries 
the values in the third and fourth group are almost the same. The extent of decrease of total 
labour input raises when moving from lower to higher quartiles, which may explain the above 
counter-intuitive situation. This raises the question of what is a more appropriate measure of 
family involvement, namely the amount of family labour or its share in total labour. The 
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share approach, as reflected in Table 1, can lead to defining a µtypical¶ family farms as one 
with modest size employing very little hired labour.   
16 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics for corporate farms and family farms by quartile of family labour 
usage 
 Corporate farms 
Family farms by quartile of family 
involvement 
 
 (0,0.25] (0.25,0.5] (0.5,0.75] (0.75,1] 
 
Romania 
Share of farms (%) 0.30 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.51 
Share of UAA (%) 0.91 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Share of Output (%) 0.94 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Share of Labour (%) 0.81 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.08 
Average UAA (ha) 823 330 36 23 14 
Average Output (000 cu)1 2,234 620 76 29 18 
Average Labour (AWU) 24.68 16.17 2.74 2.13 1.38 
Average Family Labour 
(AWU) 0.00 0.75 1.02 1.33 1.32 
 
Czech Republic 
Share of farms (%) 0.35 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.48 
Share of UAA (%) 0.82 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.07 
Share of Output (%) 0.88 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 
Share of Labour (%) 0.89 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.05 
Average UAA (ha) 1,280 632 313 166 80 
Average Output (000 cu)1 1,884 553 296 182 75 
Average Labour (AWU) 43.67 12.03 5.04 3.42 1.85 
Average Family Labour 
(AWU) 0.00 1.55 1.91 2.15 1.83 
 
Hungary 
Share of farms (%) 0.21 0.08 0.14 0.13 0.45 
Share of UAA (%) 0.66 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.15 
Share of Output (%) 0.77 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.08 
Share of Labour (%) 0.72 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.09 
Average UAA (ha) 673 164 119 96 70 
Average Output (000 cu)1 1,198 205 147 107 60 
Average Labour (AWU) 20.26 5.67 2.96 2.02 1.15 
Average Family Labour 
(AWU) 0.00 0.80 1.06 1.22 1.10 
 
Spain 
Share of farms (%) 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.15 0.73 
Share of UAA (%) 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.14 0.71 
Share of Output (%) 0.02 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.56 
Share of Labour (%) 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.54 
Average UAA (ha) 133 65 58 51 50 
Average Output (000 cu)1 273 376 168 100 73 
Average Labour (AWU) 6.85 8.13 3.00 2.00 1.33 
Average Family Labour 
(AWU) 0.00 0.92 1.13 1.27 1.28 
1
 cu means currency unit 
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However, in this paper we focus on whether we can find support for the theoretical conjecture 
that suggests that the potential benefits of family farming are related to lower monitoring 
costs. Any such benefits are more likely to accrue due to the amount of family labour rather 
than its share. The share of family labour implicitly captures the differential effort involved in 
family and hired labour input. In other words, the potential benefit this measure captures is 
due to the expectation that family members work harder. The absolute amount of family 
labour on the other hand represents the commitment of the family to the farm operation. 
Higher level of commitment is expected to lead to more organisational improvements that 
could result in a more productive farm. Therefore, we measure family involvement by the 
amount of family labour, rather than its share. 
 
5. Results 
Figure 1 presents the relative density differentials associated with the efficiency 
decomposition, i.e. total, M and F-efficiency differentials, for each of the EU Member States 
analysed. They are computed as density differentials between family and corporate farms. If 
the theoretical conjecture of the superiority of family farms relative to corporate ones is true, 
one would expect more probability mass in the family farms distribution towards the upper 
end of the density range. This would show as a negative differential at the lower end of the 
density range and positive one at the upper end, resulting in generally upward-sloping 
efficiency differential. If the family farms are inferior, the opposite would be true.  
Let us first consider the total efficiency effects, derived from the production function that 
does not separate family and non-family labour. A mostly downward-sloping total efficiency 
effect is observed for all countries. This means that there are fewer family farms at the higher 
efficiency levels than corporate ones, suggesting that family farms are, on aggregate, not as 
efficient as corporate ones. For Romania and the Czech Republic however if only the top of 
the density range (i.e. the top 10 per cent efficient farms) is considered, family farms compare 
favourably to corporate ones. 
The efficiency decomposition results are more subtle and varied amongst countries. For 
Romania and Hungary the M-efficiency differentials are relatively small and this results from 
the fact that the total efficiency differential follows closely the F-efficiency differential. In 
other words, the total production effect of family farms in these two countries is mostly 
defined by the F-efficiency. Hence, in these two countries there is not much difference in the 
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managerial capabilities contribution to efficiency in family and corporate farms, but family 
farms are generally not as efficient as the corporate ones.  
In Romania, at the top end of the efficiency spectrum, the F-efficiency effect roughly offsets 
the negative impact of M-efficiency and as a result the total efficiency differential is close to 
zero. So some, although very limited, support for the superiority of the most efficient family 
farms can be found in this case. But then these family farms do not manage to take advantage 
of this since they are unable to translate this potential into actual (i.e. total) efficiency gains, 
due to worse M-efficiency, i.e. due to worse management capabilities.  
 
Figure 1. Efficiency differentials by country 
 
For Hungary, at the top end of the efficiency density range the M-efficiency effect appears to 
dominate and to account for virtually the entire efficiency differential.  
For the Czech Republic the M-efficiency differential dominates the efficiency differentials, 
but the F-efficiency is clearly expressed translating into an overall positive total efficiency 
differential at the highest efficiency scores. The F-efficiency differential has the expected 
upward slope demonstrating the superiority of family farming. However, similarly to 
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Romania, this potential efficiency gains from family farming fail to realise due to the fact that 
they are more than offset by M-efficiency losses.  
Finally, for Spain the hat-like shape of the M-efficiency differential, combined with the weak 
recovery in F-efficiency effect, tentatively suggests that both these effects may be present 
(which is easier to notice in the  right-hand part of the graph) with an overall small negative 
total efficiency differentials. 
In summary, Figure 1 shows that the F-efficiency density differential is upward sloping 
(although only becoming positive for the Czech Republic) as efficiency increases. This 
confirms the results of Kostov et al (2016) that family farming gains are realised after an 
efficiency threshold is reached, i.e. only for the most efficient farms.  
Using a counterfactual simulation approach, Kostov et al. (2016) claim that family 
involvement generates additional output effects, but these only materialise at a significantly 
high threshold of 1.75 AWU of family labour input. To re-examine such findings, the 
analysis considers the extent of family involvement, measured by the amount of family 
labour input, assuming that family farms that employ more family labour are more deeply 
engaged in the farming business. Such farms are denoted here as µmore involved¶. Since 
family labour is a continuous variable, it is difficult to assess the impact of family 
involvement. For this reason we discretise the variable by synthetically splitting family farms 
into groups defined by 0.5 AWU increments of family labour. The corresponding efficiency 
differentials (compared to corporate farms) for each of these groups are calculated. These 
differentials are used to investigate the way family involvement affects the efficiency 
decomposition.  
The corresponding F and M-efficiency differentials are presented in Figures 2 and 3 
respectively. To facilitate interpretation, only the efficiency score levels of 0.6 to 1.2 are 
presented. The reason for this is as follows. The highest efficiency scores could represent 
outliers. Similarly we remove the most inefficient levels to eliminate the impact of any 
potential outliers. In general, the argument for superiority of family farms should translate 
into downward slope for the M-efficiency differential and an upward one for the F-efficiency 
differential. Based on Kostov et al (2016), we would expect such results to gradually appear 




Figure  2.  Changes in F-efficiency effects by family involvement 
 




Considering F-efficiency, in general, it is enhanced by greater family involvement. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that greater family involvement will lead to positive efficiency 
gains due to better monitoring. Let us look at the shape of the relevant differentials for 
adjacent categories.  In some of these adjacent categories (in particular in the case of the <0.5 
and the <1 AWU category pairing, as well as the <1.5 and >1.5 AWU pairing) the 
corresponding differentials may slightly deviate from this ordering since the next category (of 
greater family involvement) may not always lead to greater F-efficiency. This could be a 
result of actual thresholds which are slightly different from the ones used here to create the 
underlying family involvement groups. The most important conclusion from Figure 2 is that 
there is evidence of monitoring effects for all countries with the possible exception of Spain. 
Another point is that in the case of the Czech Republic it appears that too much family 
involvement has a negative impact, since the <1.5 AWU category shows the best potential 
efficiency gains (i.e. it is more efficient than the >1.5 AWU category). However, such a result 
needs to be treated with caution due to the smaller number of observations in the >1.5 AWU 
category. In general, these results corroborate the assumption that greater family involvement 
improves efficiency. 
With regard to M-efficiency, Figure 3 presents how this changes with the level of family 
involvement. Unlike F-efficiency, the M-efficiency differential effects (in the sense of regular 
pattern across categories) are only observed for some of the groups of family farms 
considered here. For example, in Romania only the low (<0.5 AWU) and high (>1.5 AWU) 
levels of family involvement demonstrate such effects. In the Czech Republic, there is no 
evidence for family involvement affecting the M-efficiency effect.  However, the results have 
to be treated with caution due to the small number of family farms in some categories. In 
Hungary the M-efficiency effect occurs at all levels of family involvement but only for the 
highest one (>1.5 AWU) it is visibly stronger. In Spain, however, we observe exactly the 
opposite case with the strongest effect for the least involved (<0.5 AWU) family farms and 
very little difference in the other categories. Hence unlike the case of F-efficiency, there does 
not appear to be any definite link between family involvement and M-efficiency (which 




6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper examined quantitatively the claims of the µVXSHULRUity¶ in terms of economic 
efficiency of the family form of organisation of agricultural production compared to non-
family µFRUSRUDWH¶ IDUPLQJ 7KH WKHRUHWLFDO DUJXPHQWV UHODWHG WR WKH VXSHULRULW\ RI IDPLO\
farming are centred on family labour, which could be more productive and involving lower 
monitoring costs than hired labour as it is more motivated in its role as a residual claimant on 
farm profits (Allen and Lueck, 1998; Pollak 1985). Recently, Kostov et al. (2016) have 
established limited empirical support for this conjecture. 
The paper aims at contributing more detail to the debate on whether family farm is superior 
under modern conditions when technology, globalised food chains, and even policy 
requirements favour larger, often corporate farms. To test the empirical predictions of 
theoretical models, the analysis compared the efficiency distributions of family and corporate 
farms by decomposing total efficiency into two distinct components, namely F-efficiency, 
associated with the potential gains/losses derivable from the family form of organisation of 
farming activities, and M-efficiency, which measures the individual faUP¶V PDQDJHULDO
capabilities to realise any such efficiency gains. The results suggest that both effects are 
present to a certain degree. However, while greater family involvement (measured by family 
labour input) appears to always enhance F-efficiency, this is not so for M-efficiency. The M-
efficiency does not show a regular pattern of variation with the level of family involvement. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the M-efficiency effect and the degree of family 
involvement is not common for all analysed EU Member States. For some countries (e.g. 
Hungary) a greater family involvement increases this effect while for others (e.g. Spain) it 
reduces it. For Romania the effect is larger for both small and high level of family 
involvement. These results suggest that the management capabilities that determine M-
efficiency are most likely dependent on the nature of industry/country and as such can 
interact with the family involvement in a variety of ways, unlike the F-efficiency which is 
strictly increasing with greater family involvement. Therefore, it appears that the existing 
emphasis on the family effects, i.e. F-efficiency, that seems to underlie much of the literature 
on the superiority of family farming, is misplaced. It is only by decreasing, or in the best case 
removing the negative M-efficiency effects, i.e. by improving the management capabilities of 
family farms, that total efficiency gains could be achieved. These results imply that policy 
makers in Europe should focus more on enhancing management capabilities of family 
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farmers if the aim is to strengthen family farming for economic and most of all for non-
economic reasons ± e.g. social and environmental. 
This paper only considered four EU Member States ± it would be interesting to see the 
similarities and differences across all EU Member States in order to discern a more consistent 
pattern across groups of European countries possessing a similar farm structure. In order to 
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